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Imposing Liability for "Control"
Under Section 7 of the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act
Norman Abrams*
The Uniform Limited Partnershp Act as adopted in 1916 is currently law in
forty-nine states. Section 7 of the Act protects himitedpartnersfrom general liabil-
ity unless they takepart in control of the business. The author considers the four
separate testsfor control that have been developed by courts and commentators.
Finding each of them unsatisfactory, heproposes an "effects" test based solely on
causation as afairer and more valuable approach. Applying this test, the author
evaluates several types of activities which typical limitedpartners may wish to un-
dertake, including shareholderpowers. In 1976 the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws recommended that states adopt a revised
version of the Uniform Limited Partnershp Act. The 1976 version adopted one of
thefour control tests evaluated by the author andspecifically granted limitedpart-
ners shareholderpowers. Mr. Abrams' analysis of thepurpose ani function of the
control rule raises several questions concerning the viability of this approach. He
concludes that this legislation is difficult to reconcile with theproposed effects test
and with the principles incorporated by the framers into the originalAct.
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Imposing Liability for "Control"
Under Section 7 of the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act
INTRODUCTION
THE CONTROL RULE contained in section 7 of the original
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA) remains today, more
than sixty years after it was drafted,1 one of the more perplexing
aspects of limited partnership law. Section 7 is entitled "Limited
Partner Not Liable to Creditors" and provides that: "A limited
partner shall not become liable as a general partner unless, in ad-
dition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner,
he takes part in the control of the business."2 The ULPA does not
offer a definition of control, and cases and commentators have
1. The original Uniform Limited Partnership Act [hereinafter cited as ULPA (1916)]
was drafted in 1916 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
6 U.L.A. II (1969). It has been adopted in substantial part in 49 states plus the District of
Columbia and the Virgin Islands. 6 U.L.A. 94 (Supp. 1978). In 1976, the Conference
promulgated a revised version of the Act [hereinafter cited as ULPA (1976)]. 6 U.L.A. 114
(Supp. 1978).
2. ULPA § 7 (1916).
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failed to provide a meaningful framework against which limited
partners may measure the boundaries of permissible participation.
One reason the problem has remained unresolved for so many
years is that few cases dealing with control have actually come
before the courts. As a result, courts dealing with the issue have
reached no agreement on firm rules, leading commentators to
conclude that equitable considerations applied on a case-by-case
basis, rather than clear principles, have been the primary determi-
nants of litigation on control.3 To add to this uncertainty, the cases
and commentaries interpreting them suggest no less than four dis-
tinct tests for defining control. Two of these look to the nature of
the limited partner's participation in the operations of the enter-
prise. Of these, one can be termed a "quantitative power" test.' It
takes into consideration every contact the limited partner had with
the enterprise to determine if his participation was such that he
might be characterized as having exercised powers reserved to
general partners. If so, he will be held liable as a general partner
under section 7. The second is a refinement of the first. It can be
described as a "day-to-day powers" test.5 Under this test a limited
partner will be held liable if an evaluation of his participation in-
dicates that he assumed day-to-day responsibility for managing
partnership affairs.
The other two tests may be generally characterized as reliance
tests. Neither attempts to determine the character of the limited
partner's participation in partnership affairs. Instead, under these
tests, a limited partner will become generally liable to partnership
creditors if he appeared to be a general partner. The first of these
is the traditional specific reliance test.6 A creditor must demon-
strate that he associated with the enterprise because he believed
that the limited partner was a general partner and that this belief
was induced by words or acts of the limited partner or of others
acting with his approval. If so, the limited partner will be liable to
that creditor on any obligation owed him by the partnership as if
3. Feld, The "Control" Test for Limited Partnerships, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1471, 1476
(1969); Note, Foreign Limited Partnersh#Ps: A ProposedAmendment to the Unform Limited
PartnershopAc4 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1174, 1193-95 (1974); Comment, Control in the Limited
Partnersh/j 7 J. MAR. J. PRAc. & PROC. 416,424 (1975); 56 MicH. L. REV. 285, 286 (1957).
4. See, ag., Holzman v. DeEscamilla, 86 Cal. App. 2d 858, 860, 195 P.2d 833, 834
(1948).
5. See, ag, Gast v. Petsinger, 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 394, 323 A.2d 371 (1974).
6. E.g, Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 517 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974)
rev'd, 526 S.W.2d 543 (rex. 1975); Note, supra note 3, at 1195; 6 Tax. TECH. L. REv. 1171,
1175 (1975).
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he were a general partner. Under this rule a limited partner might
be personally liable to some creditors and not to others.
The second reliance test is actually an estoppel test.7 Under
this standard, a creditor must demonstrate that the limited part-
ner's actions were such that an objective observer might reason-
ably have concluded that the limited partner appeared to be a
general partner. The necessity of proving actual reliance is elimi-
nated. A creditor could recover from a limited partner if he had
been unaware of the limited partner's existence at the time he
dealt with the partnership, or even if he had known that the lim-
ited partner was a limited partner and had no reason to assume
otherwise.
The inability of courts and commentators to agree on a single
control test8 has meant that a limited partner has no way of know-
ing what form of participation in partnership affairs a court might
choose to characterize as control. Only by opting to forego any
form of active involvement in a limited partnership can a limited
partner assure his limited liability. Perhaps the chilling effect cre-
ated by this uncertainty, more than anything else, explains the
paucity of cases relating to control.9
It is not at all clear, however, that the draftsmen of the ULPA
intended to restrict limited partners to such a minimal role in part-
nership activities. Indeed, the draftsmen sought to attract investors
by creating a form of partnership organization in which investors
could participate with the confidence that they would not face un-
reasonable risks of general liability to partnership creditors. 10 It
7. Feld, supranote 3, at 1480.
8. A. BROMBERG, CRANE & BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP 147 (1968); Note, supra
note 3, at 1192-93; Comment, supranote 3, at 419.
9. Comment, supra note 3, at 419.
10. ULPA § 1, Official Comment, at 562 (1916); Lewis, The Uniform LimitedParner-
shi. 4c4 65 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 723 (1917). The common law recognized no distinction
between those who merely invested in an enterprise and those who actively managed its
affairs. Against creditors both were held to be partners in the enterprise and were person-
ally bound to the full extent of the enterprise's obligations. ULPA § 1, Official Comment,
at 562-63 (1916). As a result, partnership participation was effectively limited to those indi-
viduals interested in taking a direct role in the conduct of the enterprise. This meant that
the amount of capital available for the use of the business was only as large as those
amounts which the managers themselves were able to contribute. Few, if any, investors
were willing to jeopardize the security of their entire estate by placing a portion of it in the
hands of another. The limited partnership was designed to provide partnerships with new
sources of working capital by freeing investors from the burdens of general liability. Id at
562; Lewis, supra at 723.
The ULPA was not the first statutory effort to limit partnership liability. For a discus-
sion of the history of limited partnerships, see F. TROUBAT, THE LAW OF COMMANDATARY
AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS IN THE UNITED STATES 17-112 (1853). The first limited part-
788 [Vol. 28:785
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seems unlikely that the drafters could have believed that investors
would be willing to place their capital under the complete control
of a general partner without being able to exercise at least some of
the powers enjoyed by corporate stockholders. There is no reason
to assume that a small amount of control exercised occasionally at
a broad policy level would place too great a restriction on a gen-
eral partner's freedom to run the partnership.
Several provisions of the ULPA grant certain express powers
to limited partners. Section 9 provides the limited partners with a
collective veto power to override various acts undertaken by gen-
eral partners which may have a significant effect on the structure
or continued viability of the partnership. 1 Section 10 gives the
limited partner the rights to inspect and copy the partnership
nership act was enacted by New York in 1822, and many other states soon adopted legisla-
tion modeled on the New York scheme. ULPA § 1, Official Comment, at 563 (1916).
These first-generation statutes, however, failed to attract investors in significant num-
bers because the limited liability they provided could be too easily lost. A limited partner
was considered to be a common law partner who was protected from court application of
common law rules of liability by legislative edict. Id Individuals acquired this protection
when the partnership which they were about to join met the exact requirements established
by the state. Failure to satisfy any statutory condition deprived the partnership of this
protective cloak extended by the legislature, and creditors were free to move against all
participants as if they had been partners in a simple partnership all along, even though the
creditor had not demonstrated reliance on the error. In Smith v. Argall, 6 Hill 479 (Sup. Ct.
1844), aftd, 3 Denio 435 (N.Y. 1846), for example, a limited partner was held liable as a
general partner because the amount of his contribution was incorrectly shown in one of two
newspaper notices the limited partnership was required to publish on formation. The error
was due to a printer's error. The creditor did not have to prove reliance.
Frequently limited partner status hinged on technicalities having little, if any, reason-
able relationship to the basis of the claims being asserted or the good faith of the parties
involved. In Haggarty v. Foster, 103 Mass. 17, 19 (1869), noted in Lewis, supra note 10, at
721, the court observed: "It is wholly immaterial that the transaction at the time was hon-
estly intended and understood by the parties to be sufficient; that the securities actually
transferred afforded the means by which their cash value was in fact subsequently realized;
or that creditors were not actually defrauded." For other examples of cases requiring strict
statutory compliance, see Holiday v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 3 Colo. 342 (1877); Pierce v.
Bryant, 87 Mass. (5 Allen) 91 (1862); Richardson v. Hogg, 38 Pa. 153 (1861).
A number of courts, however, adopted a more liberal approach to interpreting the early
limited partnership acts. These courts avoided imposing liability for technical errors. See
Manhattan v. Laimbeer, 108 N.Y. 578, 15 N.E. 712 (1888); accor4 Crouch v. First Nat'l
Bank, 156 Ill. 342, 40 N.E. 974 (1895); Buch v. Allen, 145 N.Y. 488, 40 N.E. 236 (1895);
Levy v. Lock, 47 How. Pr. 394 (N.Y. 1874); Johnson v. McDonald, 2 Abb. Pr. 290 (N.Y.
1855).
11. Specifically, § 9 provides:
(1) A general partner shall have all the rights and powers and be subject to
all the restrictions and liabilities of a partner in a partnership without limited
partners, except that without the written consent or ratification of the specific act
by all the limited partners, a general partner or all of the general partners have no
authority to:
(a) Do any act in contravention of the certificate,
1978]
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books, to demand "true and full information" concerning partner-
ship affairs, to obtain a court decree ordering a dissolution of the
partnership, and to share in partnership profits.12 The question
that must be answered is: What implied powers does the act per-
mit limited partners to exercise without overstepping the bounds
of the section 7 control test? Courts and commentators agree that
the ULPA grants implied powers to limited partners,' 3 but the
four control tests they have developed do not adequately delineate
the scope of these implied powers.
This article examines the four existing tests and proposes a
fifth, which may be characterized as an "effects" or a "wasting
assets" test. Like the quantitative power test and the day-to-day
powers test, the "effects" test looks to the nature of the limited
partner's participation in the affairs of the partnership. It avoids,
however, any attempt to characterize that participation as either
an exercise of powers granted to general partners or as an exercise
of powers reserved for limited partners. The test instead analyzes
the effects of any management decision made by a limited partner
on the ability of the partnership to satisfy obligations owed to
third parties. A limited partner will be liable as a general partner
under this test if he has exercised his own independent judgment
on behalf of the partnership with the result that the enterprise has
insufficient assets to meet creditor obligations.' 4 Finally, the arti-
cle considers the consequences of applying an effects test to a
number of activities which a limited partner might typically con-
sider undertaking. Special attention is given to certain activities
(b) Do any act which would make it impossible to carry on the ordinary
business of the partnership,
(c) Confess a judgment against the partnership,
(d) Possess partnership property, or assign their rights in specific partnership
property for other than a partnership purpose,
(e) Admit a person as a general partner,
(f) Admit a person as a limited partner, unless the right so to do is given in
the certificate,
(g) Continue the business with partnership property on the death, retirement
or insanity of a general partner, unless the right so to do is given in the certificate.
ULPA § 9 (1916).
12. Id § 10.
13. Courts have consistently refused to impose § 7 liability, even though limited part-
ners performed acts not explicitly authorized by statute. See, eg., Well v. Diversified
Properties, 319 F. Supp. 778, 782 (D.D.C. 1970). CompareFeld, supranote 3, at 1481-82
with Note, supranote 3 at 1209-10 and with26 OKLA. L. REV. 289, 294-96 (1973).
14. The "effects" test proposed here is in accord with the analysis of the case law
dealing with § 7 contained in 26 OKLA. L. REv. 289 (1973): "In every case found, general
liability was imposed on the ground of interference by the limited partners to the extent
that it was they, and not the general partners, who had been responsible for impairing
creditors' security." Id at 293 (footnotes omitted).
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which are similar to those exercised by shareholders in a corpora-
tion. Several states have amended section 7 to grant limited part-
ners such "shareholder" powers. These powers are evaluated in
terms of the effects test and the policies underlying the original
statute.
I. EXISTING TESTS FOR CONTROL UNDER SECTION 7
A. The Quantitative Power Test
The quantitative power test derives' from an analysis of the
earliest section 7 cases decided under the ULPA. One of the first
cases to deal explicitly with the problem of control was Holzman
v. DeEscamilla.15 The general partner was a tenant farmer who
had formed a limited partnership with two investors to cultivate
his land. Within a year the partnership became insolvent, and the
creditors sought to recover from the limited partners. The court
held that the limited partners had exercised control and were lia-
ble as general partners. It noted that the limited partners often
decided what crops were to be planted, sometimes against the
wishes of the general partner, DeEscamilla.16 Particularly telling
was the fact that the general partner could not write checks on the
enterprise without the cosignature of one of the two limited part-
ners. "Either Russell or Andrews," the court observed, "could
take control of the business from DeEscamilla by refusing to sign
checks for bills contracted by him and thus limit his activities in
the management of the business." 1
7
A similar analysis was used by the courts in two subsequent
cases to determine whether a limited partner could be held gener-
ally liable. In each instance, the court looked to the limited part-
ner's participation in the affairs of the partnership. In Silvola v.
Rowlett," a creditor of a partnership, which operated an auto
dealership, brought an action against the limited partner when the
venture went into bankruptcy. Although the limited partner acted
as a foreman in the repair shop and advised the general partner
from time to time on enterprise affairs,19 the court concluded that
final decisions on all matters were made by the general partner.
"[S]ole control and managment," the court noted, "rested with the
15. 86 Cal. App. 2d 858, 195 P.2d 833 (1948).
16. Id at 860, 195 P.2d at 834.
17. Id
18. 129 Colo. 522, 272 P.2d 287 (1954).
19. Id at 528, 272 P.2d at 290-91.
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[general partner]," and "the activities of the [limited partner] were
at all times subject to such control. '20 The implication of this
holding is that the limited partner was not personally responsible
for wasting partnership assets and consequently, should not be
held liable to partnership creditors.
In Grainger v. Antoyan,21 the limited partner served as the
sales manager of the partnership and as such sold new cars and
had limited charge of that department.22 The court examined the
extent of the limited partner's participation and concluded that he
did not conduct himself in a manner which would make him lia-
ble as a general partner. The court found that the evidence
"clearly demonstrates that defendant had no control over prices,
purchases, the extension of credit, wages, salaries, employment, or
the funds of the. . . firm, and that he in fact did not take part in
the control of the . . . firm's business. 23
These early cases caused considerable difficulty for both courts
and commentators24 since the cases appear to turn on the nature
of the limited partner's participation in the enterprise. The courts
made no express attempt to seek any causal relationship between
the limited partner's participation and the harm suffered by credi-
tors, although this element is present in each case. The cases sug-
gest instead that courts were measuring the extent of a limited
partner's participation. 25 The implication is that at some point the
sum of the limited partner's acts in the partnership crossed an im-
aginary line between controlling and noncontrolling participation.
The courts seem to have been looking to some quantitative test of
control.26
The quantitative test has proven to be impractical because of
the difficulty of measuring participation. For example, how many
acts are needed to constitute control? What kinds of acts are sig-
nificant? Has a partner performed an act of control if he insists
that the general partners purchase a particular kind of typewriter
for the partnership offices? If so, how is this to be compared to
another act in which a limited partner forces the general partner
to plant crops ill-suited to the climate as in Holzman? In addition,
20. Id at 528, 272 P.2d at 290.
21. 48 Cal. 2d 805, 313 P.2d 848 (1957).
22. Id at 808, 313 P.2d at 850.
23. Id at 813, 313 P.2d at 853.
24. See, e.g, Gast v. Petsinger, 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 394, 402, 323 A.2d 371, 375 (1974);
Feld, supranote 3, at 1475-77.




the same act can mean entirely different things in different cir-
cumstances. A limited partner who plants a particular crop on a
200 acre plot will have greater effect on partnership affairs if the
partnership farms only 200 acres than he will if it farms ten times
that acreage. Every partnership is unique. On the basis of this fact
alone, it has been suggested that any effort to establish a consis-
tent measure of control is doomed to failure.27
One commentator suggests that the characterization of types of
participation may offer a solution.28 Thus, it might be possible to
conclude that a limited partner has exercised control if he has
done "anything which would affect the partnership's relations to
third parties."29 This approach helps identify the kind of acts on
which one might base liability, but only restates the basic ques-
tion. At what point can an act be said to affect third parties? How
direct must the effect be?30 How extensive must the effect be? A
limited partner affects third parties if he buys a typewriter. Is he to
become generally liable to all creditors because he affected this
one third party? If not, the same measurement problem arises.
Thus, this approach offers little increased predictability.
The danger of a quantitative test is that it will operate to force
courts to rely almost entirely on equitable considerations. It offers
no definitive reason for concluding that a certain amount of
power is permissible but that a little more is not. To avoid case-
by-case determinations, courts would have to adopt the kind of
arbitrary, technical distinctions the draftsmen of the ULPA ex-
plicitly set out to avoid.3" Line drawing might mean that liability
would be imposed even though no justifiable explanation for do-
ing so could be found. Such a rule, one commentator observed,
would be "incompatible with the [drafters'] emphasis on the pre-
sumption in favor of limited liability in the absence of a reason for
holding the partner generally liable."'32
B. The Day-to-Day Powers Test
In the wake of the initial efforts to resolve the "contror' di-
27. Gast v. Petsinger, 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 394, 402, 323 A.2d 371, 375 (1974); Feld,
supranote 3, at 1477; Comment, supra note 3, at 424.
28. SeeFeld, supranote 3, at 1477-78.
29. Id
30. Feld seems to overlook the possibility of a limited partner affecting third parties
indirectly. He suggests, for example, that under this view limited partners could determine
general partner salaries but could not restrict their directorial activities. See id at 1478.
31. See id at 1479.
32. Id
19781
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lemma, courts in two cases33 attempted to refine the quantitative
test by developing what may be characterized as a day-to-day
powers test. As in the quantitative power cases, the courts which
employed the day-to-day powers analysis looked to the limited
partner's role in partnership operations. But the courts attempted
to avoid the problem of measuring the limited partner's participa-
tion as a method of determining general liability. Instead, under
the day-to-day powers test, a limited partner exercises control suf-
ficient to subject himself to section 7 liability if his participation
constitutes the day-to-day exercise of power over the operation of
partnership affairs on a continuous basis.
In Wel v. Diversified Properties,34 the general partner in a real
estate venture sued the limited partners to establish their general
liability to partnership creditors. The limited partners had taken
away his day-to-day control when the partnership was on the
verge of insolvency. The court held that the partners were bound
by the terms of the agreement which provided that "day-to-day
management of the business of [the] partnership" 35was reserved to
the general partner. The court also concluded that the limited
partners did not subject themselves to general liability when they
attempted to salvage the business of the partnership because their
actions did not amount to the normal day-to-day course of busi-
ness activities within the meaning of the partnership agreement.36
By the time the general partner gave up his responsibility for man-
agement of the partnership to the limited partners, "funds coming
in were far from sufficient to meet current obligations, and no
partnership account was being accumulated. ' 37 The court con-
cluded that "this clearly was not a normal day-to-day business
question; it involved the very ability of the enterprise to sur-
vive."' 38 The implication is that by the time the limited partners
intervened, there was really nothing left over which normal day-
to-day control could be exerted.
It is reasonable to assume that if the case had come before the
court on the complaint of one of the partnership creditors the
court would have held much the same way:
33. Weil v. Diversified Properties, 319 F. Supp. 778 (D.D.C. 1970); Gast v. Petsinger,
228 Pa. Super. Ct. 394, 323 A.2d 371 (1974).
34. 319 F. Supp. 778 (D.D.C. 1970).
35. Id at 781.





Certainly common sense dictates that in times of severe fman-
cial crisis all partners in such an enterprise, limited or general,
will become actively interested in any effort to keep the enter-
prise afloat and many abnormal problems will arise that are
not under any stretch of the imagination mere day-to-day mat-
ters of managing the partnership business. This is all that oc-
curred in this instance.3 9
A similar analysis was undertaken in Gast v. Petsinger,40 where
the limited partners served as engineering consultants on a
number of partnership projects. A creditor sued, claiming that this
participation was sufficient to establish general liability. As in
Well, the partnership agreement vested control of day-to-day op-
erations in the general partner. 41 This was, the court observed,
"[c]onsistent with statutes regulating limited partnership ... ."42
The case was remanded to determine whether the limited part-
ners, who formally were serving only as consultants, had sufficient
influence to control day-to-day operations:
It is not apparent from the face of the record that the technical
skills and training of [the limited partners] did by virtue of their
retention as "Project Managers" place them in a position where
their "advice" did influence and perhaps, control the decision
of the General Partner, whose particular expertise is un-
known.4
3
If the general partner were incapable of making informed
business judgments concerning partnership affairs and were defer-
ring instead to the decisions of the limited partners, then they
would have been subject to general liability. As the court noted:
"The 'control' a partner has in the day-to-day functions and oper-
ations of the business is the key question. Does the limited partner
have decisiomaking authority that may not be checked or nulli-
fied by the general partner?" 44
The Gast court seemed to suggest that occasional consultation
by a limited partner is permissible under the control rule. This
would provide a limited partner with much more certainty as to
the kind of control he could exercise under the ULPA than would
a quantitative test. It would also seem to assure limited partners
more freedom to participate in the partnership decisionmaking
process. The rule implied in Well, on the other hand, may be less
39. Id
40. 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 394, 323 A.2d 371 (1974).
41. Id at 397-98, 323 A.2d at 373.
42. Id at 398, 323 A.2d at 373.
43. Id
44. Id at 402, 323 A.2d at 375.
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extensive. The court's emphasis on the fiscal crisis which precipi-
tated the intervention of the limited partners would suggest that
such action is permissible only in unique circumstances. Under
this approach occasional participation without a showing of abso-
lute necessity might subject a limited partner to general liability.
A test which conditions general liability solely on the exercise
of day-to-day powers, as the court adopted in Gast, would provide
a much more workable standard for establishing liability than the
less refined quantitative powers test. If a limited partner assumes
powers that are usually attributable to a general partner on an
ongoing basis, he will become generally liable. If, however, he ex-
ercises authority only occasionally, his limited liability will likely
remain unimpaired. Problems might arise when a court has to de-
termine when participation has become frequent enough to consti-
tute day-to-day control, but for the most part the range of
uncertainty would be less extensive than under a purely quantita-
tive test.
This test has a number of disadvantages, however. It would
seem to lead to a just result in the case of the limited partner who
insisted that the partnership buy a particular typewriter. Read lit-
erally it would also seem to protect the limited partners in
Holzman, if the one and only decision they interjected into enter-
prise operations was their choice of a particular crop. Suppose, for
example, a limited partnership is formed to purchase and operate
real estate properties. The partnership agreement provides that
purchases are to be made by majority vote of all partners, both
limited and general. Over a period of five years the partnership
acquires two apartment houses. The investments turn out to be
unwise. It is questionable whether the limited partners would be
held to have exercised control under the tests of either Weil or
Gast. Yet it seems hard to deny that they are as responsible for
creditor losses as the general partners. Confronted with these
facts, the Gast court would probably be less likely to interpret sec-
tion 7 as it did. It would be clearly inequitable to deny a creditor
the right to recover against a limited partner who made occasional
management decisions but had not assumed ongoing day-to-day
control if those decisions played some role in the subsequent in-
solvency of the partnership. The day-to-day powers test, therefore,
would seem to confer broader powers on the limited partners than
the draftsmen may have intended.
A problem shared by both the day-to-day powers test and the
quantitative powers test is that neither considers the relationship
[VCOL 28:785
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between the limited partner's activities and the creditor's losses. A
creditor might recover from a limited partner whose participation
had not affected the creditor in any way. On the other hand, a
creditor might be denied recovery even though the limited part-
ner's activities were directly responsible for the losses he has suf-
fered. The result in either instance would be arbitrary and
inequitable.
This problem arises because both tests operate on the assump-
tion that a limited partner who exercises the kind of powers usu-
ally reserved to general partners is effectively a general partner
and should be treated like one. However, it is submitted that the
rules for determining the creditors to whom a general partner will
be liable should not apply to a limited partner who controls. A
general partner in any partnership is liable to all those who trans-
act business with the enterprise while he is associated with it.45
While the decisions made by a general partner who joins an oper-
ating partnership can have a devastating effect on the ability of
prior creditors to recover on partnership obligations outstanding
at the time he becomes a general partner, the Uniform Partnership
Act (UPA) limits his liability to prior creditors to the amount of
any contribution he makes to the partnership.46
If a limited partner who exercises control is treated as if he
joined the partnership on the day he began to exercise control, he
would also be liable to prior creditors only to the extent of his
contribution to the partnership. This result would seem to be im-
proper for two reasons. First, if new general partners were liable
to prior creditors, partnerships would find themselves hard-
pressed to obtain needed management skills. The exigencies of
commerce require that an enterprise be able to obtain managers
capable of responding to changing conditions and markets. The
UPA rule recognizes this fact. The same rationale should not serve
to limit the liability of a limited partner who participates in con-
trol. His participation comes only by virtue of his investment asso-
ciation with the enterprise. There is no reason to believe that he
brings with him any special skills, managerial or otherwise, that
are likely to benefit the partnership or its creditors. Thus, the need
for special encouragement and protection is gone.
Second, the UPA approach can be justified by the fact that a
general partner is treated as if he exercises management authority
45. UPA §§ 15, 17, 36 (1914); ULPA § 9 (1916).
46. UPA § 17 (1914).
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on a continuous basis whether or not he actually does so. To es-
cape liability to future creditors, he must cease all association with
the partnership. A limited partner, on the other hand, is in a posi-
tion to exercise management powers whenever he chooses, main-
taining a passive position at all other times without having to
disassociate himself from the enterprise. Thus, a limited partner,
unlike a general partner, is in a position to exercise a single act of
control. If the UPA rule were applied to this limited partner, he
might, by his single act, bankrupt the partnership without incur-
ring personal liability.
In fact, it can be argued that prior creditors have dealt with the
enterprise on the understanding that, because an individual has
claimed the status of a limited partner in the filing certification or
elsewhere, he would not be managing partnership affairs. Of all
the individuals in the world who might assume control of a part-
nership, a creditor has at least some right to expect that those who
specifically represented that they would not assume control can be
relied upon not to do so. To deny a creditor the right to recover
from a limited partner whose decisions prevented recovery from
the partnership would seem to be contrary to the equitable princi-
ples the draftsmen sought to infuse into the ULPA. a7
On the other hand, if prior creditors are permitted to recover, a
limited partner will be treated as if he had become a general part-
ner before he began to exercise control. Unless liability is linked
to some form of causation, there is no other way to determine at
what point this liability arose.
Such logic would prevent a court from disallowing the claims
of subsequent creditors. This, too, could produce an inequitable
result. Subsequent creditors should not be permitted to argue that
they have been harmed by activities undertaken before they de-
cided to transact business with a particular enterprise. Otherwise,
once a limited partner exercises control, he might discover that he
has subjected himself to liability to all subsequent creditors of the
partnership, even though he may have ceased active participation
and even though any effects of his participation may long since
have been rendered benign. Having once exercised control, he
could never be sure his liability to future creditors would cease
until he terminated his association with the partnership altogether.
This would be true even though his control may have caused the
partnership no harm. It may even have benefited the partnership
47. See ULPA § 1, Official Comment (1916).
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and improved opportunities for creditor recovery. Partnership in-
solvency may come several years later. It may be entirely unre-
lated to anything the limited partner may have done, but unless a
court is willing to look directly at the relationship between partic-
ular acts of control and the harm they have caused, inequitable
consequences may result.
C. The Specfic Reliance Test
The search for a defensible rule has led a number of courts48
and commentators 49 to conclude that the draftsmen might have
intended section 7 to protect creditor reliance. General liability
would arise whenever the acts of a limited partner have given a
creditor a reasonable basis for concluding that he is actually a
general partner. Since the creditor has a right to assume that all
general partners are generally liable, the limited partner has a
duty to make sure that he has given no one cause to adopt such an
erroneous belief.
Reliance considerations are referred to in the official commen-
tary to the ULPA,5° although not specifically in connection with
section 7. In two of the early control cases, courts indicated a will-
ingness to entertain reliance claims. In Silvola v. Rowlett," the de-
fendant limited partner had been employed as a foreman in the
partnership repair shop and had purchased parts without the
knowledge or consent of the general partner. Nonetheless, the
court determined that the limited partner had not taken part in
control, reasoning that the plaintiff could not have relied on the
limited partner being generally liable because he had had actual
knowledge of the defendant's limited partner status. In Rathke v.
Griffith,5 2 the limited partner had cosigned several documents
with the general partners and had negotiated contracts with third
parties on two occasions. These activities, the court concluded,
had been conducted under the direction of the general partners.
The limited partner's testimony that he had never "in any sense
managed the affairs of the concern or had the power to initiate
and control execution of policy' 53 was uncontradicted. The court
48. Eg. Silvola v. Rowlett, 129 Colo. 522, 272 P.2d 287 (1954); Rathke v. Griffith, 36
Wash. 2d 394, 218 P.2d 757 (1950).
49. Feld, supra note 3, at 1476; Note, supra note 3, at 1195-97.
50. ULPA § 1, Official Comment (1916).
51. 129 Colo. 522, 272 P.2d 287 (1954).
52. 36 Wash,2d 394, 218 P.2d 757 (1950).
53. Id at 407, 218 P.2d at 764.
1978]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
added: "[I]t is not alleged that respondent ever relied on Mr. Grif-
fith's position as a general partner, or in fact even understood that
Mr. Griffith was anything other than a limited partner. 54
More recently, the Washington Supreme Court held that in the
absence of actual reliance a creditor could not recover from lim-
ited partners who controlled a partnership by acting as directors of
the corporate general partner.5 5 By contrast, the Texas Supreme
Court has on similar facts expressly rejected reading a reliance
standard into section 7,56 observing that "[t]he statute makes no
mention of any requirement of reliance on the part of the party
attempting to hold the limited partner personally liable. 57
Commentators were quick to perceive the advantages of a reli-
ance standard for section 7 control.58 The simple justice of the
principle is undeniable. Reliance is after all one of the basic equi-
table tools of the common law. Then, too, the principle of reliance
seems to correspond with the essential outlook of the ULPA
draftsmen. As has been observed, the entire drafting process can
be characterized as an attempt to eliminate the arbitrary decisions
of pre-ULPA courts and infuse notions of equity into the interpre-
tations of limited partnership problems.5 9 Creditor reliance is the
basic thrust of many sections of the ULPA,6° and it is specifically
identified as an underlying principle of the statute in the drafts-
men's Official Comment to section 1.
6 1
Most appealing to commentators, however, was recognition of
the fact that investing partners would enjoy more freedom to par-
ticipate in enterprise management if a reliance standard was read
into section 7 than they would under a more arbitrary quantitative
power test.62 It seemed to offer a limited partner, as a quantitative
54. Id at 408, 218 P.2d at 764.
55. Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Properties, Inc., 88 Wash.2d 400, 562 P.2d 244
(1977). The court noted, however, that the use of an inadequately capitalized corporate
general partner might be an independent basis on which to find individual liability. Id. at
404, 562 P.2d at 246-47. But see Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 526 S.W.2d 543 (Tex.
1975) (control by limited partners as directors of corporate general partner does not avoid §
7 liability).
56. Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 526 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975).
57. Id at 545.
58. Feld, The "Control" Test for Limited Partnerships, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1471,
1478-80 (1969); 56 MICH. L. REV. 285 (1957).
59. SeeLewis, supranote 10..
60. See, e.g, ULPA §§ 5-6 (1916).
61. ULPA § 1, Official Comment (1916).
62. SeeFeld, supranote 58, at 1479.
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test could not, some ability to predict whether the acts he was un-
dertaking were the type that might subject him to general liability
under the control rule. Because a reliance standard looks to the
relationship between the limited partner and particular creditors,
a limited partner need never fear that his participation in and of
itself might be considered control.
There -are, however, a number of strong arguments against
reading a reliance standard into the control test of the ULPA. A
reliance standard would provide limited liability for a limited
partner acting as an undisclosed principal. Thus, even where the
limited partner would be liable under' any objective standard,6 3 he
would be able to manage the enterprise behind the cloak of his
limited partner status and avoid general liability.
A second objection to a reliance interpretation is that section 7,
as the Texas court observed, makes no mention of reliance.' a Yet
a limited partner's general liability in several other sections of the
ULPA is made specifically dependent upon a showing of reli-
ance.65 If the draftsmen intended to impose a reliance standard for
measuring control, one would expect to find evidence of their in-
tent in the specific terminology of section 7. Professor Alan Feld
has suggested that this oversight can be attributed to the fact that
"the ULPA is the product of a less rigorous tradition of drafts-
manship, which saw no need to spell out the precise meaning of
the control test."66 This "realistic answer" is unpersuasive and
even Feld seemed to reject it.67 If the draftsmen neglected to in-
clude a reliance standard in section 7 because of tradition, how
can one explain the obvious care they took to spell it out else-
where? In fact, the more plausible conclusion is that one of the
reasons the draftsmen saw no need to define control is that they
did not intend control to turn on the presence of reliance.
Related, and possibly more telling, is the fact that application
of a reliance test to the control rule of section 7 does not corre-
spond with the common sense meaning of the word. The diction-
ary, that great source of common sense meanings, informs us that
one who has control has the power to direct and regulate.6" Intro-
duction of a reliance element into control rule adjudications
63. See text accompanying notes 15-43 supra.
64. 526 S.W.2d at 545.
65. ULPA §§ 5-6 (1916).
66. Feld, supra note 58, at 1480.
67. Id
68. WEBSTaR's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 496 (unabr. version 1970).
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would seem to sidestep the obvious intent of the draftsmen. Taken
to its logical extreme, it would mean that a limited partner could
exercise day-to-day control without running the risk of general li-
ability as long as no one except the general partners were aware of
his activities. At the other extreme, if everyone were aware of his
limited status, the rule would permit a limited partner to run every
aspect of the business without running the risk of general liability.
No commentator has been willing to carry section 7 this far.
D. The Estoppel Test
Consequently, some commentators have found themselves in
the uncomfortable position of endorsing two separate tests for the
same rule.69 On one hand, they recognize that one who controls an
enterprise in the sense that he directs its affairs and regulates its
activities should be liable to creditors. On the other hand, they are
unwilling to deny the principle that one who induces another to
deal with an enterprise to that person's detriment should assume
the responsibility for his loss. The problem, of course, is that it is
hard to accept the notion that a single rule in a logically drafted
statute could have been intentionally designed to facilitate two
distinct interpretations serving two separate, though admittedly
related, purposes.
Recognizing this problem, Feld attempted to reconcile the two
tests into a single logical construct.70 He suggested that the drafts-
men may have designed section 7 to function on an estoppel,
rather than on a specific reliance, basis. Feld reasoned that the
draftsmen omitted a reliance test from section 7 because they were
looking not to specific incidents of reliance but to the kinds of
participation on which reliance might reasonably be based. Under
this view a limited partner would be held generally liable to a
creditor if he controlled the day-to-day affairs of the enterprise
because his activities, if known to a creditor, would have been suf-
ficient to lead him to believe that the limited partner was actually
representing himself as a general partner. When such conduct
could be shown, the limited partner would be estopped from as-
serting that a particular creditor was unaware of his participation
69. See Note, Foreign Limited Partnershps." A Proposed Amendment to the Uniform
Limited Partnershp Act, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1174, 1193 (1974); 26 OKLA. L. REv. 289, 293
(1973).
70. Feld, supranote 58, at 1480. Other commentators have apparently failed to per-
ceive that estoppel and actual reliance are not identical. See Note, supra note 69, at
1195-96; 26 OKLA. L. REv. 289, 293 (1973).
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in the enterprise and therefore could not be said to have relied on
his general liability.7'
Feld's approach is ingenious. It creates a single test capable of
serving both concerns. However, the Feld test poses a number of
problems. Suppose a limited partner orders a typewriter for the
enterprise on his own accord. He tells the typewriter salesman that
he is a general partner in the partnership. Under a specific reli-
ance test he would be liable to the typewriter company but not to
any other partnership creditor. Should all partnership creditors be
permitted to recover even if the limited partner never makes an-
other partnership decision? Feld insisted that individual creditors
need not demonstrate specific reliance. They need only demon-
strate that "liability-creating activities" can be attributed to the
limited partner.72 Yet it would be hard to deny that recovery by
any other creditor on these facts alone would be arbitrary and un-
fair. And if these activities are not sufficient to establish a reason
to impose liability, how much "liability-creating" conduct is nec-
essary? In addition to measurement problems, the test also raises
creditor identification problems. Feld suggested that any creditor
can recover if he can show that a limited partner acted as if he
were a general partner.73 Thus, one act or series of acts under-
taken at a particular point in time, after which the limited partner
ceased to perform any management role in the partnership, would
be sufficient to subject him to liability to all future creditors. This
would follow even though the decision he may have made could
not be said to have harmed them in any way. The consequence is
to convert the best features of the reliance test, fairness and sim-
plicity, into the worst feature of the quantitative power test, open-
ended liability.
The final and possibly most significant argument against
adopting either the specific reliance test or the estoppel test for
determining control under section 7 is that to do so would dupli-
cate another provision of the statutory scheme capable of provi-
ding creditors with the same protection. This conclusion, however,
is not readily obvious from analysis of the ULPA. In fact, nothing
in the ULPA, except possibly section 7, would protect a creditor
who erroneously concluded that a particular partner was a general
partner.74 This has led commentators75 to conclude that the drafts-
71. Feld, supranote 58, at 1480.
72. Id
73. Id
74. Cf. ULPA §§ 5, 6 (1916) (sections expressly providing for general liability for
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men must have meant section 7 to serve this purpose. The assump-
tion implicit in this approach is that the ULPA incorporates
within its provisions an independent, internally coherent scheme
of statutory regulation. Yet the statute itself indicates that the
draftsmen intended the ULPA to function in conjunction with the
UPA. 76
The ULPA expressly provides that the relations between part-
ners must be understood in the broad context of both statutes."
Section 1 of the ULPA states that a limited partnership is a part-
nership composed of both general partners and limited partners.
The Official Comment to section 1 indicates that the draftsmen
conceived of limited partners as being members of the partner-
ship, not partners, in spite of their name.78 Section 9 of the Act
provides in part that "a general partner shall have all the rights
and powers and be subject to all the restrictions and liabilities of a
partner in a partnership without limited partners. . .. ,,79 The ob-
vious purpose of the ULPA is to provide a framework for creating
limited partners and for resolving problems that may arise from
their relations with general partners and with creditors. At the
same time, it is clear that the draftsmen contemplated that limited
partnership problems concerning general partners exclusively or
the relationship between general partners and partnership credi-
tors were to be resolved within the framework of the UPA. Thus,
one may reasonably conclude that, where the problem at issue in-
volves an individual who may be either a limited partner or a gen-
eral partner or both, the draftsmen intended to provide courts
with recourse to the provisions of both statutes as needed to obtain
equitable resolution of the controversy.
The draftsmen state in the Official Comment to section 1 of
the ULPA that a limited partner in a partnership may become a
general partner in the same manner that any individual may be-
come a partner in an enterprise.80 Thus, when a controversy arises
because a limited partner has begun to act like a general partner,
it is not unreasonable to look to the UPA for the proper rule of
limited partners who commit formal errors in the formation of a limited partnership that
could induce reasonable reliance or support estoppel).
75. Eg., Feld, supra note 58, at 1479 (citing Lewis, The Uniform Limited Parnnershop
Act, 65 U. PA. L. Rnv. 715, 723 (1917)).
76. ULPA § 1 (1916).
77. Id§9.
78. Id § 1, Official Comment.
79. Id§9.
80. Id § 1, Official Comment, § 12.
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law. Section 16(1) of the UPA specifically deals with the rights of
creditors who have transacted business with an individual on the
mistaken assumption that he is a partner in an enterprise or with
an enterprise on the mistaken assumption that a particular indi-
vidual was generally liable for the obligations of the enterprise.
Section 16, entitled "Partner by Estoppel," provides:
(1) When a person, by words spoken or written or by conduct,
represents himself, or consents to another representing him to
any one, as a partner in an existing partnership or with one or
more persons not actual partners, he is liable to any such per-
son to whom such representation has been made, who has, on
the faith of such representation, given credit to the actual or
apparent partnership, and if he has made such representation
or consented to its being made in a public manner he is liable to
such person, whether the representation has or has not been
made or communicated to such person so giving credit by or
with the knowledge of the apparent partner making the repre-
sentation or consenting to its being made.
(a) When a partnership liability results, he is liable as
though he were an actual member of the partnership.
(b) When no partnership liability results, he is liable
jointly with the other persons, if any, so consenting to the
contract or representation as to incur liability, otherwise
separately. 1
There is nothing in either the UPA or the ULPA which would
preclude application of UPA section 16(1) to a situation in which
a limited partner takes on the appearance of a general partner. As
the Official Comment to section 1 of the ULPA seems to indicate,
there is nothing in his status as a limited partner which could be
said to confer a special privilege of nonliability. Nor is there any-
thing arising from his special contractual relationship with the en-
terprise that would seem to dictate the necessity of a special
provision in the ULPA to protect creditors who act on the mis-
taken assumption that he is something other than a limited part-
ner. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the draftsmen, who had just
completed the UPA, 2 would have had any reason to duplicate
their prior efforts or could be said to have intended to do so.
There is nothing in the UPA that would enable a creditor to
recover from a limited partner whose business judgment was re-
sponsible for the insolvency of the partnership. Under the UPA, if
81. UPA § 16(1). This approach appears to have been adopted in J.C. Wattenberger &
Sons v. Sanders, 191 Cal. App.2d 857, 13 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1963), although it has been cited as.
a case reading reliance into § 7. See Note, supra note 69, at 1195.
82. The UPA was adopted in 1914. See6 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 5 (1969).
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no question of reliance is at issue, a creditor may recover from an
individual only by demonstrating that he participated as a partner
in the enterprise.8 3 To do this he must convince a court that an
arrangement existed among the individuals in question making
each the agent of the other.s4 This may be achieved by presenting
evidence of a written or oral agreement to this effect or by demon-
strating that an implied contract can be inferred from the manner
in which the affairs of the enterprise were conducted.85 If a limited
partner participates in the partnership in a manner authorized by
the terms of the partnership agreement, the provisions of the UPA
alone will be of little assistance to a creditor, regardless of whether
his participation assumes the indicia of control over enterprise af-
fairs. The creditor will be unable to point to any agreement, writ-
ten or oral, in which participants could be said to have agreed to
share the risk of any losses occasioned by the operations of the
enterprise. Nor will he be able to point to any course of conduct
which can be said to demonstrate the existence of any arrange-
ment other than that contemplated by the partnership agreement.
By granting individuals the right to distribute risk so that some
enjoy limited liability while others do not, the ULPA creates a
situation in which the status of a limited partner serves to protect
him from the justified, reasonable claims a creditor would other-
wise seek to assert under the UPA. 6 Indeed, if one concludes that
section 7 of the ULPA was designed to protect creditors' reliance,
creditors will lose the right to protect themselves from a limited
partner whose conduct in the enterprise, unbeknownst to them,
destroyed the partnership's ability to meet its contractual obliga-
tions.
That the draftsmen of the ULPA intended to protect creditors
from limited partners who manage partnership affairs is clear. In
the Official Comment to section 1, the draftsmen listed two basic
assumptions which they intended to incorporate into limited part-
nership arrangements:
First: No public policy requires a person who contributes to
the capital of a business, acquires an interest in the profits, and
some degree of control over the conduct of his business, to be-
come bound for the obligations of the business; provided credi-
tors have no reason to believe at the times their credits were
extended that such person was so bound.
83. UPA §§ 7, 15.
84. Id §§ 6, 7, 9.
85. Id§7.
86. See ULPA § 7 (1916). See generally id § 1, Official Comment.
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Second: That persons in business should be able, while re-
maining themselves liable without limit for the obligations con-
tracted in its conduct, to associate with themselves others who
contribute to the capital and acquire rights of ownership, pro-
vided that such contributors do not compete with creditors for
the assets of the partnership.87
Commentators favoring a reliance interpretation of section 7
have noted the draftsmen's statement in the first assumption that
creditors should be able to recover from those who erroneously
lead them to believe they are generally liable for partnership obli-
gations.8 No commentator, however, has considered section 7 in
terms of the draftsmen's second assumption. One element of this
assumption is that "persons in business should be. . .liable with-
out limit for the obligations contracted in its conduct. ..." One
who merely contributes capital to a venture is not a "person in
business," but if he contributes capital and makes decisions affect-
ing the conduct of partnership affairs, he is a "person in business"
as much as any general partner. His status as a limited partner
should not protect him from the obligations his conduct has cre-
ated.
This means that creditors have two separate rights. They can
rely on those who represent themselves as being generally liable.
And, under the second assumption, creditors can also recover
from those who manage the partnership whether or not they ever
made representations to anyone. Since creditors can recover on a
reliance claim under UPA section 16(1), the statutory scheme
would be sufficient to provide both forms of protection envisioned
by the draftsmen if section 7 is given its common sense meaning.90
By contrast, if section 7 is interpreted simply as a reliance provi-
sion, a significant loophole would be created. When a limited
partner imposes his own business judgment on partnership affairs,
he should be liable to those creditors whose ability to recover from
the enterprise is thereby impaired. No other provision of either the
UPA or the ULPA is suited to this task. If it is read out of section
7, it is read out of the statutory scheme entirely.
87. Id § 1, Official Comment.
88. See, eg., Feld, supra note 58, at 1479 & n.30; Note, supra note 69, at 1175-76 &
n.8.
89. ULPA § 1, Official Comment (1916).
90. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
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II. THE EFFECTS TEST
A. The Rule and Its Justiffication
Simply stated, an effects test would make limited partners gen-
erally liable to those creditors who have been harmed because of
limited partner participation in partnership affairs. In applying
the test, a court would have to examine what a limited partner had
actually done and ask whether those activities, either alone or in
conjunction with the activities of other partnership participants,
could be said to have caused the harm suffered by partnership
creditors.
This test looks to the nature of the limited partner's partner-
ship activities, without attempting to characterize them as
more-or less--characteristic of those undertaken by general part-
ners. Because it derives its basic premises from the common sense
meaning of section 7, it adopts the most significant element of the
quantitative and day-to-day powers tests.91 The test also functions
to prevent a limited partner from secretly controlling partnership
affairs without risking liability for the consequences. In this way
the two major weaknesses of the specific reliance test are
avoided.92 And yet by introducing a causation element, the rule
offers courts the same benefits previous courts sought by utilizing
a reliance factor in their deliberations. Like reliance, causation is a
tool of historically proven value with which courts are familiar
and which they know how to use. Like reliance, it is grounded in
the essentially equitable notion that those whose acts or omissions
bring harm to another should bear the burden for the damage that
results.
There is at least as much justification for introducing causa-
tion into section 7 as for introducing reliance. Read independently
of the rest of the statute, the control rule of section 7 seems to
make no distinction between acts of control which harm creditors
and those which do not. A different result obtains, however, when
section 7 is interpreted in light of the express dictates of section
28(1). Section 28 is entitled "Rules of Construction" and states
that "[t]he rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are
to be strictly construed shall have no application to this act."' 93 In
effect, this provision instructs courts to interpret the statute in a
manner that will avoid arbitrary determinations. In other words, a
91. Id
92. See text accompanying notes 63, 68 supra.
93. ULPA § 28(1) (1916).
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participant in a limited partnership should not be held liable un-
less he has done something to justify such a result. Therefore, in
interpreting section 7, a court should consider whether the activi-
ties of the limited partner have produced any injury to partnership
creditors. If not, the imposition of liability would be arbitrary.
A significant advantage of the effects test is that it would pro-
duce the same results as those reached by courts applying the
quantitative power test and the day-to-day powers test while
avoiding the difficulties of those tests. In Holzman v.
DeEsamilla,94 which involved a farming operation,95 the limited
partners were held liable as general partners because they were
making the business decisions which led the partnership to insol-
vency. If the limited partners had exercised their powers wisely,
the enterprise would have prospered, and no one would ever have
challenged them for the control they exerted. But the business fell
apart, and the decisions made by the limited partners had a more
than insignificant effect on the subsequent insolvency of the part-
nership.96 Creditors who might otherwise have been fully paid out
of the accumulated assets of a prosperous enterprise were harmed
as a result of the actions of the limited partners. Thus, the right
granted them by the court to recover from the limited partners can
be considered neither undeserved nor arbitrary.
In both Silvola v. Rowletl97 and Grainger v. Antoyan,98 cases
involving auto dealerships,99 courts refused to impose liability on
the limited partners once they concluded that the general partners
in each instance had made all business decisions affecting their
respective enterprises. 1° The responsibility for the insolvency of
those ventures was theirs; in neither case could the limited partner
have been said to have done anything to harm partnership credi-
tors. In Gast v. Retsinger,1t 1 the court stated that the limited part-
ners would be liable if, in the guise of consultants, they actually
directed partnership affairs.' 2 If so, they as much as anyone else
played a part in causing the insolvency of the partnership. In Well
94. 86 Cal. App.2d 858, 195 P.2d 833 (1948).
95. See generally text accompanying notes 15-17 supra.
96. 86 Cal. App.2d at 860, 195 P.2d at 834.
97. 129 Colo. 522, 272 P.2d 287 (1954).
98. 48 Cal.2d 805, 313 P.2d 848 (1957).
99. See generally text accompanying notes 18-26 supra.
100. See id
101. 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 394, 323 A.2d 371 (1974). See notes 40-43 supra and accompa-
nying text.
102. Id at 403, 323 A.2d at 375.
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v. Divers/fied Properties,°3 the court refused to extend general lia-
bility to limited partners who acted to salvage a failed business."
Here, by the time the limited partners became involved, all dam-
age that could be done had been done, so that the acts of the lim-
ited partners could not be said to have harmed third parties
extending credit to the venture.
Another advantage of the effects test over the quantitative or
day-to-day powers tests is that it offers greater predictability.
When liability is made dependent on the effects of acts rather than
on their size or nature, the measurement and comparison
problems created by the earlier tests are eliminated. A limited
partner is instead given a reasonable basis against which to evalu-
ate different forms of participation. Thus, a single consistent stan-
dard can be applied to every act or group of acts. The limited
partner is assured that if the act or acts he is about to undertake
are unlikely to contribute to the insolvency of the partnership, he
faces little risk of liability. Of course, there is a point at which it
may be unclear whether a particular act or series of acts is or is not
likely to have a greater than insignificant effect on partnership
solvency. The conservative limited partner will have to avoid that
ambiguous area. However, it is a significantly smaller area of un-
certainty than would exist under a quantitative test.
In addition, the effects test would provide a basis for identify-
ing creditors to whom a limited partner would be liable. It would
permit prior creditors to recover under section 7 and provide a
rational means for determining when liability should properly
cease. If the act is of a kind that poses some risks for the enter-
prise, and that act, once undertaken, proves to be beneficial or at
least not harmful, a limited partner will know that a court a year
or more in the future will not subject him to liability because of
that act. If the limited partner insists that the general partner plant
watermelons and the crop produces enough profits to pay off part-
nership creditors, but the partnership becomes insolvent for other
reasons two years later, no creditor will be able to claim that the
limited partner's earlier participation made him liable as a general
partner under section 7. The partnership might have made more
money by planting a different crop, but that is a matter for the
general partner and the limited partner to resolve between them-
selves. If all obligations to creditors are met, they have no cause
103. 319 F. Supp. 778 (D.D.C. 1970); see text accompanying notes 34-39 supra.
104. 319 F. Supp. at 783.
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for complaint. If the watermelon crop proves unsuccessful and the
partnership becomes insolvent, prior creditors will be able to re-
cover from the limited partner because his decision was responsi-
ble for the losses they incurred when the partnership ceased to pay
its bills.
Under the rule proposed here, a fact finder would have to re-
solve two questions. The first pertains to the nature of the limited
partner's participation in enterprise affairs. The fact finder would
have to conclude that the limited partner's association with the
enterprise included participation in the decisionmaking processes
by which the nature and extent of enterprise operations and com-
mitments were determined. Before general liability could be es-
tablished, however, the fact finder would also have to be
convinced that, given the scope and character of the limited part-
ner's decisionmaking role, it had not insubstantially contributed to
the insolvency of the enterprise.
Finally, as a basic matter, it should be observed that an indi-
vidual who assumes the status of a general partner has agreed to
assume personal responsibility for protecting creditor interests. An
individual who becomes a limited partner assumes no such re-
sponsibility. At the same time, however, a creditor who deals with
a partnership which contains limited partners has a right to expect
that they will not exercise management authority. If a limited
partner subsequently exercises management powers over enter-
prise affairs, his participation, no matter how short-term or ex-
tended, significant or insignificant, will have some effect on the
profitability of the enterprise. If his participation increases the
profitability of the enterprise, the creditor will not be harmed. If
his participation reduces the profitability of the partnership, the
creditor will still suffer no harm. He will not be harmed unless
and until the effects of his participation are such that the enter-
prise is no longer in a position to satisfy its outstanding obliga-
tions.10 5
105. It should be noted that in certain areas courts have been reluctant to consider the
effects of business decisions. The business judgment rule applicable to corporate directors,
for example, has evolved because courts have refused to examine the effects of business
judgments made by directors. W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE COR-
PORATIONS § 1039 (rev. perm. ed. 1975). If a director acts in good faith on the basis of his
own honest, independent evaluation of the facts, no stockholder will be permitted to hold
him responsible for the consequences. Id There are, however, important differences be-
tween the effects test proposed here and a rule that would hold directors liable for poor
judgment. First, an effects test would be easier to apply than a poor judgment test. Under
the latter the court would have to determine if the judgment was a reasonable one given the
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B. The Scope of Permissible Participation Under an Effects Test
Limited partner participation in partnership affairs can as-
sume many forms. By examining, in light of the effects test, a
number of the more typical forms of business activity a limited
partner might undertake, it is possible to determine the extent to
which the test would enable a limited partner to exercise power in
a partnership without subjecting himself to general liability under
section 7.106
1. The Limited Partner as an Employee
If case law is any indication, a limited partner may often be an
employee of the partnership. 10 7 Under an effects test, activities un-
dertaken by a limited partner on behalf of the enterprise would
circumstances at the time it was made. The court would then have to determine whether
the decision had actually reduced stockholder profits. Since such a suit could be brought
against the director of an ongoing corporation as well as an insolvent one, a court would
have to try to unravel the effects of this particular decision from those of all other decisions
to see if it had caused losses. It would then have to measure the dollar amount of such
losses so damages could be ascertained.
By contrast, a court would not be called on to apply an effects test unless a limited
partnership in which limited partners are alleged to have exercised managerial authority
became insolvent. Litigation would normally arise only once in the life of a limited part-
nership, and even then only under particular circumstances. A court would have to decide
only whether the limited partner's participation had a detrimental effect on partnership
viability that was not insignificant. If so, the limited partner has contributed to the insol-
vency of the partnership and would be liable to creditors for the full amount of partnership
obligations. The court would not have to decide whether the judgment he exercised was
reasonable. The court would not have to separate its effects from the hundreds of others
made in an ongoing enterprise, and it would not have to apportion a monetary value on the
particular damage done.
Second, the application of an effects test would promote the purposes of the legislative
scheme of the ULPA whereas a poor judgment test would undermine many corporate law
principles. In the latter situation, a rule that made directors liable to stockholders for the
adverse consequences of each of their decisions would discourage them from taking any
actions that seemed at all risky. Yet stockholders elect directors to take the kind of risks
necessary to produce a profit. Creditors do not elect limited partners, and for the most part
they have every reason to assume that limited partners are not exercising their own busi-
ness judgments. Creditors also do not have any interest in partnership profits. The partner-
ship is simply indebted to them for a set amount, and their interest extends only to seeing
that the partnership acts responsibly to better assure their return. An effects analysis, un-
dertaken by the courts, would therefore serve as an effective check on limited partner ex-
cesses and preserve creditors' rights in a manner that is both equitable in result and
predictable in operation. Causation issues are complex, but not insurmountable. There is
no reason to assume that the facts of every § 7 case will necessarily be ambiguous. None of
the cases cited in this article would seem to pose serious causation problems. The causation
element of an effects test may be a burden, but it is unlikely to be an unfamiliar one.
106. See note 105 supra.
107. E.g, Gast v. Petsinger, 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 394, 323 A.2d 371 (1974).
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not subject him to general liability if he did not participate in
making the business decisions which determined how he should
act. Thus, a limited partner could be employed as an agent of the
limited partnership if the ultimate judgments concerning the obli-
gations to be assumed and the activities to be performed by the
enterprise are made by others. This view is consistent with the po-
sition taken by the courts. Ih both Silvola and Grainger the lim-
ited partners were employees of their respective limited
partnerships. 10 Neither exercised any power to commit the enter-
prise to third parties, and the courts concluded they had not con-
trolled within the meaning of section 7.109 In Rathke v. Griffith, 0
the limited partner signed several documents and conducted nego-
tiations on two occasions representing the enterprise. The docu-
ments were also signed by the general partners, and the court
concluded that, though he might have had authority to conduct
negotiations, the final decisions to commit the enterprise one way
or the other had been made by the general partners."'
The same logic would enable a limited partner to advise the
general partners on partnership affairs. If the limited partner has
no power to impose his own business judgments on the determina-
tion of enterprise policy, the responsibility for the decisions actu-
ally made is not his. The power of ultimate determination remains
with the general partners.' 12
The rule would also protect limited partners who have suc-
ceeded in imposing valid limitations on the general partner's free-
dom of action in the terms of the partnership agreement.1 3 For
example, suppose the limited partner insisted that the agreement
provide that the enterprise grow watermelons exclusively." 4 In
such cases the limitation has been freely entered into by contract.
Though the limited partner may have wanted this restriction, the
general partner was free to refuse it if he concluded that it would
be unwise to assume general liability on such terms. The ultimate
108. Grainger v. Antoyan, 48 Cal. 2d 805, 313 P.2d 848 (1957); Silvola v. Rowlett, 129
Colo. 522, 272 P.2d 287 (1954).
109. 48 Cal. 2d at 813, 313 P.2d at 853; 129 Colo. at 528, 272 P.2d at 290-91.
110. 36 Wash. 2d 394, 218 P.2d 757 (1950).
111. Id at 406, 218 P.2d at 764.
112. SeeGrainger v. Antoyan, 48 Cal. 2d 805, 313 P.2d 848 (1957); Gast v. Petsinger,
228 Pa. Super. Ct. 394, 323 A.2d 371 (1974); Rathke v. Griffith, 36 Wash. 2d 394, 218 P.2d
757 (1950).
113. Of course, if the limited partner has acted in violation of § 7, he would not be
protected simply because the action was authorized by the partnership agreement.
114. SeeULPA §§ 2(l)(a)(l1), 3 (1916).
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responsibility thus lies with the general partner, and a subsequent
creditor has no basis for recovering from anyone else. 115
2. The Limited Partner as an Officer or Director of a Corporate
General Partner
A major question arises when an individual who is a limited
partner also serves as a director of a corporate general partner
which, were it his only connection with partnership affairs, would
shield him from general liability to creditors of the firm. If he ex-
ercises an important role in deciding the course of partnership af-
fairs and the partnership becomes insolvent, should he be
generally liable because he is a limited partner who has exercised
control of partnership affairs, or should his limited liability con-
tinue unimpaired because he is protected in his corporate capac-
ity?
Several courts have recently dealt with this problem. The UPA
permits a corporation to be a partner in a partnership," 6 and the
ULPA makes no distinction between a partner under the UPA
and a general partner in a limited partnership." 7
In Delaney v. Fidelity Lease, Ltd,"18 the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals concluded that limited partners in such situations do not
violate the control rule of section 7. The Texas Supreme Court
overturned the Court of Civil Appeals, holding the limited part-
ners generally liable for exercising control.' 19 Soon thereafter the
Washington Supreme Court in Frigidaire Sales Corporation v.
Union Properties, Inc.'2 adopted the view of the Texas Court of
Civil Appeals on similar facts. 2'
115. This position is also in accord with the holding of Plasteel Prods. Corp. v.
Helmann, 271 F.2d 354 (lst Cir. 1959). There the partnership agreement provided that the
general partner would have to obtain the approval of the partnership general manager
before making any enterprise commitments. The general manager was an employee, not a
general partner. But the named general manager was the father of the beneficiaries of a
trust that was a limited partner in the enterprise. Id at 355. The general partner was free to
fire the general manager at any time, but once he left the employ of the partnership, it was
obligated to buy out the interest of the trust. Id Creditors sued all the limited partners
under § 7. The court concluded that the only evidence of participation attributed to the
trustee-limited partner was the signing of the partnership agreement. Beyond that the lim-
ited partners had assumed no role in partnership affairs. Id at 356. They could not be said
to have affected the viability of the enterprise as against subsequent creditors.
116. UPA §§ 2, 6 (1914).
117. SeeULPA §§ 1, 2 (1916).
118. 517 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974), rev'd, 526 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975).
119. 526 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975), rev'g 517 S.W.2d 420 (rex. Civ. App. 1974).
120. 88 Wash.2d 400, 562 P.2d 244 (1977).
121. Compare517 S.W.2d at 425 with 544 P.2d at 782.
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In Delaney, the defendants argued that their status as the sole
officers, directors, and stockholders of the corporate general part-
ner insulated them "from personal liability arising from their ac-
tivities or those of the corporation."' 122 But because the limited
partners were using a corporation to circumvent the dictates of
section 7, the Texas Supreme Court felt justified in disregarding
the corporate fiction.123
The Washington Supreme Court criticized the Texas Supreme
Court for its willingness to "pierce the corporate veil." The Wash-
ington court argued in Frigidaire that the corporate fiction is not
to be disregarded without a "showing of any fraud, wrong or in-
justice perpetrated upon the creditor. ... 1 Without this, the
court argued, the corporate officers and directors qua corporate
officers and directors did not act improperly, and justification for
"piercing" was absent.125
By "piercing," the Texas Supreme Court sought to achieve the
result it would have obtained if it had applied section 7 directly.
The applicability of such an approach, however, is limited. One
commentator has observed that liability imposed under a "pierc-
ing" theory may have different results than might liability im-
posed under section 7.126 If, in Delaney, all stockholders and
officers were not limited partners, disregard for the corporate fic-
tion would have subjected them to general liability as well. If the
case were decided solely on section 7 grounds, then only the parti-
cipating limited partners would be personally liable.
The Texas Supreme Court need not have dealt with this issue
as it did. Corporate status may well protect an officer or director
from personal liability for his activities on behalf of the corpora-
tion. Corporate status will not protect him, however, if a corporate
participant assumes an independent duty to creditors of the corpo-
ration. For example, if a corporate officer agrees to be personally
liable for any obligations the corporation is unable to satisfy, he
may not subsequently assert that his corporate status precludes the
122. 526 S.W.2d at 546.
123. Id It may also be significant that the court considered unsettled the question
whether a corporation can ever serve as a general partner in a limited partnership under
Texas law, id, even though Texas has adopted the UPA and the ULPA. TEx. STAT. ANN.
6132a, 6132b (1970 & Supp. 1978).
124. 544 P.2d at 785.
125. Id
126. Dennis, Limited Partnersop--Limited Partners Who Control Corporate General
Partner are Subject to PersonalLiability ar GeneralPartners, 7 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 745,751
(1976).
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imposition of personal liability. Thus, there is no reason why an
individual who becomes a limited partner under the ULPA can-
not be held to have committed himself to be generally liable if he
exercises control in any capacity. When a limited partner becomes
a corporate director, that should not eliminate his liability under
limited partnership law. Instead, his acts should simply have sig-
nificance under two separate sets of legal rules. The Texas
Supreme Court could have held that an individual who assumes
the status of a limited partner has agreed not to participate in the
decisionmaking processes of the partnership in which he has an
interest. If he does exercise management authority, the fact that
his participation is under the guise of a separate legal capacity
should make no difference. Just as employment status cannot, by
itself, shield one from liability under section 7,127 neither should
one's position as a corporate director. For this reason, the contrary
holding of the Washington Supreme Court in Frigidaire was sim-
ply wrong.
3. The Limited Partner as an Independent Contractor
A similar situation may arise when a limited partner deals
with the partnership as an independent contractor. In Gast v.
Petsinger,128 for example, the limited partners were consultants to
the partnership.1 29 The court held that if the limited partners had
controlled the partnership through their position as consultants,
they violated the rule of section 7.13° An individual's assumption
of one legal relationship with a partnership should not extinguish
obligations assumed in another capacity.
4. The Limited Partner Who Reallocates Control
A limited partner should also be liable in certain cases where it
may appear that he did not contribute to the insolvency of the
partnership. Consider, once again, the facts of Holzman. 1 31 There,
the limited partners were making all the business decisions of the
enterprise. Assume that, instead of being the inept farmers they
proved to be, they were actually quite skilled, and the partnership
127. See, e.g., Plasteel Prods. Corp. v. Helmann, 271 F.2d 354 (Ist Cir. 1959); section
II(B)(1) supra.
128. 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 394, 323 A.2d 371 (1974).
129. Id
130. Id at 402, 323 A.2d at 375.




was prosperous. It became insolvent, however, after the general
partner absconded with all the partnership funds.
Under either the quantitative power test or the day-to-day
powers test, the limited partners would be liable to partnership
creditors since they had controlled partnership affairs. If a court
were applying the effects test, the limited partners would, no
doubt, attempt to avoid liability by arguing that they had not sto-
len the funds and thus had done nothing to cause the partnership's
insolvency. But since they assumed responsibility for all partner-
ship activities, the limited partners were responsible for ade-
quately protecting the funds from theft or at least insuring against
such a contingency. The same would be true if the villain turned
out to be the partnership accountant or another third party. The
limited partners may have been negligent in failing to provide ade-
quate protection for their assets. They may have exercised poor
business judgment in entrusting their finances to an accountant
who subsequently proved unreliable. The fact that the general
partner turned out to be the one who stole the funds makes the
limited partners no less responsible. They controlled the buisiness.
They should have taken whatever steps were necessary to prevent
loss of their assets.
The effects test also would not protect a limited partner who
exercises significant ongoing authority in some areas but who al-
lows others to run other aspects of the business. Even if the insol-
vency of the partnership is directly attributed to the management
activities of others, the result should be the same as in the example
above. Suppose the partners divided responsibility so that the gen-
eral partner alone was responsible for monies received from part-
nership creditors. Creditors could not claim in that event that the
limited partners were responsible for overseeing the security
measures required to protect the liquid assets of the partnership,
but the limited partners did participate in the decision by which
responsibility for different areas of partnership activity were di-
vided in derogation of the general partner's statutory right to
manage the partnership. 32 The ULPA protects a limited partner
as long as he leaves the running of the partnership to others. Once
he starts taking an active role in partnership affairs, he becomes
responsible for the consequences of the decisions he makes. He
cannot isolate himself from liability by limiting his sphere of deci-
sionmaking to a single area of endeavor and ignoring what his
132. ULPA § 9 (1916); see UPA §§ 9-14 (1914).
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fellow partners do. If his decision to rely on others is wrong, he
has made a bad judgment and should not be protected from his
own bad judgments at the expense of partnership creditors.
5. The Limited Partner Who Exercises Sporadic Control
Under the effects test occasional participation in the decision-
making activities of the partnership may be sufficient to constitute
control if any of the acts at issue has had a deleterious effect on
the ability of creditors to recover from the partnership. For exam-
ple, if the sole act of the limited partners in Holzman had been to
insist, over the objections of the general partner, that watermelons
be planted, they would be liable if the crop was so unsuccessful
that the enterprise was unable to meet its commitments. If in
Rathke v. Griffith,133 the limited partner had participated in mak-
ing a number of policy decisions relating to the negotiations he
conducted or the documents he signed, the fact finder would have
had to determine whether the compounded effects of these acts,
considered either as a single continuous exercise of authority or as
individual events, had contributed to the losses suffered by enter-
prise creditors.
6. The Limited Partner Who Takes Control During Emergencies
The decision in Weil v. Diversifted Properties134 implies that in
certain emergency circumstances a limited partner may interject
his own business judgments into partnership affairs without sub-
jecting himself to general liability under section 7.135 The efforts
of the limited partners in that case were designed to save what
could be saved of the failing enterprise. The implication of the
decision is that liability should not be imposed since the real harm
had already been done and the limited partners were acting in a
manner that would benefit creditors as well as themselves. If sec-
tion 7 is interpreted as an effects test, a limited partner would be
free to exercise his business judgment as he sees fit, but he would
always become liable to all creditors who may be harmed by his
participation. Thus, the automatic safe harbor that may arguably
be found in Weil would be denied under an effects test.
A rule that permits participation in emergencies assumes that
the limited partners have something special to contribute in such
133. 36 Wash.2d 394, 218 P.2d 757 (1950).
134. 319 F. Supp. 778 (D.D.C. 1970).
135. Id at 782.
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situations. Indeed, in Weil, the limited partners exercising control
possessed a great deal of specialized expertise. 36 Moreover, the
situation was so desperate that nothing could be done. 137 In a
more typical case, however, it is likely that one or the other or
both of these elements will be absent. Assuming that a real busi-
ness emergency arises, there is little reason to assume that the av-
erage limited partner will be capable of doing more good than
harm. Nor is there reason to believe that limited partners will
have a special ability to determine when an emergency has arisen
or that limited pariners will act only when the situation has be-
come hopeless. Thus a principled basis for such an "emergency
rule" is hard to find.
In addition, such a doctrine would be difficult to administer. A
court faced with this problem would have to define what a crisis is
and determine whether one existed at the time the limited partners
interfered. If none existed but the limited partners acted out of
honest belief and their participation seriously impaired the finan-
cial condition of the partnership, a court would have two choices.
A holding in favor of the limited partners would mean that lim-
ited partners would be free to exercise control whenever they hon-
estly believe the enterprise to be in trouble. This would seem to be
contrary to the notion that creditors can deal with a partnership
confident that it will be responsibly managed at all times. When
limited partners interfere and assume control because they errone-
ously believe a crisis exists, they are by definition acting irrespon-
sibly under the statute.13 8 Alternatively, if a court holds for the
creditors after a limited partner took over the business on the erro-
neous belief that an emergency existed, this would mean that lim-
ited partners could not interfere without sacrificing their limited
liability unless a genuine crisis had occurred. Limited partners
would be encouraged to participate whenever they perceive that
an emergency has arisen, but they would be held liable if their
perception proves to be erroneous. This requires them to make a
business judgment they may be ill-equipped to make, but they will
know that if they pass that hurdle they will be able to do whatever
they think best without fear of general liability. Under an effects
test, a court would not look to the factors encouraging limited
partner participation. Instead, the single issue would be causation
and the court would examine the actual management decisions
136. The most active of the limited partners, Baer, was a Certified Public Accountant.
Id at 779.
137. Id at 784.
138. SeeULPA §§ 7, 9 (1916).
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made by the limited partners under the circumstances. Thus, lim-
ited partners would be on continual notice that if they decide to
participate, they should be very confident about their business
abilities before they take any action that might affect the viability
of the partnership. 139
7. The Limited Partner Who Brings a Derivative Action
Under the view of control proposed here, a limited partner
should be able to bring a derivative action on behalf of the enter-
prise without running any significant risk of incurring general lia-
bility. Yet there is authority that a limited partner risks liability in
such instances since he is making decisions affecting the enterprise
prise that are otherwise reserved to the general partners. 140 The
New York Legislature, responding to this problem, has specifi-
cally exempted limited partners from any general liability that
might arise from such participation. 14 1 Bringing the suit itself is
unlikely to harm the enterprise, and as with any derivative suit, a
court will usually determine whether the action is in the interests
of the enterprise as a whole before allowing it to go forward.' 42 If
the action is lost, the enterprise will not be worse off. If it is won,
the assets of the enterprise will increase. In either circumstance,
therefore, a creditor would have no claim against a limited partner
under section 7 if it is interpreted as an effects test. The New York
statute is merely a restatement of that result.
139. Under an effects test, a limited partner may act without hesitation if he knows in
advance that the act he is about to undertake is one which cannot harm creditors of his
partnership. Weil v. Diversified Properties, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 778 (D.D.C. 1970), in which
the court characterized the limited partners' participation as an effort to refinance the en-
terprise, furnishes an example of such an act. Thus, if a limited partner limits his participa-
tion to negotiations between prior creditors and potential sources of new capital, his
activities can hardly be said to have harmed prior creditors, whether or not refinancing is
achieved. If a refinancing effort is successful, however, the limited partner may be liable to
those extending replacement credit unless agreement has been reached holding him harm-
less.
140. Bedolla v. Logan, 52 Cal. App. 3d 118, 125 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1975); Executive Hotel
Assocs. v. Elm Hotel Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 354, 245 N.Y.S.2d 929 (Civ. Ct.), afdmem., 43
Misc. 2d 153, 250 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sup. Ct. 1964); accord, Millard v. Newmark & Co., 24
App. Div. 2d 333, 266 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1966). For a discussion of limited partner derivative
actions, see Note, Procedures and Remedies in Limited Partners' Suitsfor Breach of the
General Partner's Fiduciary Duty, 90 HARv. L. REv. 763, 770-77 (1977).
141. N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW §§ 115-a to 115-c (McKinney Supp. 1977-78).
142. G. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTIcE § 717 (1959).
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8. The Limited Partner ffho Exercises Shareholder Voting
Powers
The number of limited partners who find themselves exercis-
ing direct authority over partnership affairs is probably fairly
small. The typical limited partner is likely to be a bona fide inves-
tor with little interest in actual management. Of more immediate
concern to him is whether his limited status will be endangered if
he attempts to exercise powers similar to those reserved to share-
holders in a corporation. The emergence of public limited partner-
ships has increased concern in this area, and the uncertainty
surrounding the scope of section 7 has led several states to amend
section 7.143 These amendments create exceptions to the applica-
tion of the control rule, but they do not attempt any specific defi-
nition of control. Under these amendments, limited partners may
vote on "matters affecting the basic structure of the partnership"
without subjecting themselves to general liability. 1 The revisions
state that structural matters include election and removal of gen-
eral partners, termination of the partnership, amendment of the
partnership agreement, and sale of all or substantially all partner-
ship assets. 145
Power over what these amendments characterize as structural
matters, however, can be utilized to exercise considerable, if indi-
rect, control over less structural, more operational matters. The
possible consequences of this indirect authority have long been
recognized in corporation law,1 46 and the freedom of stockholders
to exercise these powers is strictly limited by statute. For example,
shareholders usually have the power under state corporation law
to initiate procedural changes in corporate by-laws, although they
may surrender it to the directors,14 7 but substantive changes rela-
ting to the certificate of incorporation cannot be initiated by
shareholders.148 Shareholder approval is required, but only after
143. Eg., CAL. CORP. CODE § 15507 (West 1977); DEL. CODE tit. 6, § 1707 (1974);
NEv. REV. STAT. § 88.080 (1973); OR. REV. STAT. § 69.280 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 25.08.070 (Supp. 1977); see ULPA § 303(b) (1976).
144. Eg, CAL. CORP. CODE § 15507(b) (West 1977).
145. Id
146. See, eg, Charlestown Boot & Shoe Co. v. Dunsmore, 60 N.H. 85 (1880); Conti-
nental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912); Matter ofAuer v. Dressel,
306 N.Y. 427, 118 N.E.2d 590 (1954).
147. Eg, DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 109 (Cum. Supp. 1977); MD. CORP. & ASS'NS. CODE ANN.
§ 2-109(b) (1975); TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.23 (Vernon Supp. 1978). Under the
Model Act, power to amend the by-laws rests with the directors unless reserved to the
shareholders by the articles. MBCA § 25.
148. Eg, DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 242 (1975).
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the changes have been recommended by the directors. The sale of
all or substantially all of the assets of a corporation requires stock-
holder approval but, like the power to amend the charter, can only
be exercised on the recommendation of management. 149 Stock-
holders do have the power to dissolve the corporation of their own
initiative but only by unanimous vote. 150 Otherwise, directorial
action is a prerequisite. 5 The amended limited partnership stat-
utes seem to place no similar limitations on partnership arrange-
ments. Consequently, the limited partners can initiate any of these
changes at any time. The effect of the amendment is to give inves-
tors in limited partnerships substantially more control over these
areas than that exercised by stockholders. This is true even though
limited partners must share ownership of the enterprise with its
managers and even though general partners, unlike corporate
managers, always face unlimited personal liability for partnership
obligations. These provisions may make limited partnerships
more attractive to investors, but they also deprive general partners
of a great deal of their freedom to conduct the business affairs of
the partnership as they deem best. 152 Of even greater significance
is the fact that the amended versions of section 7 grant limited
partners the power to remove general partners. 153 While this
power may be viewed as analogous to the power of shareholders
to remove directors,154 the amendments provide no special protec-
tion for minority voting interests and are somewhat anomalous
where the manager involved is also an owner of the enterprise
who faces liability beyond that of a corporate manager. Indeed, it
seems unlikely that the drafters of the original ULPA ever envi-
149. Eg., id §271.
150. E.g., id § 275(c).
151. Eg., id § 275(a), (b).
152. The amendments, of course, permit only limited partners to negotiate for these
powers, but application by state securities commissions of the Midwest Securities Commis-
sioners' Statement of Policy would assure that limited partners in public limited partner-
ships, at least, will enjoy these powers. SeeMidwest Securities Commissioners Association,
Statement of Policy Regarding Real Estate Programs § 7B, I BLUE SKY L. RP. (CCH)
4821 (adopted Feb. 28, 1973, amended Feb. 26, 1974, July 22, 1975) (requires the partner-
ship agreement to include provisions allowing removal of the general partner, election of a
new general partner by vote of limited partners, amendment of the limited partnership
agreement, and approval or disapproval of the sale of all or substantially all the assets,
unless state law is inconsistent).
153. Eg., CAL. CORP. CODE § 15507(b)(I) (West 1977); DEL. CODE tit. 6, § 1707(b)(3)
(1974); NEV. REv. STAT. § 88.080(2)(a) (1973); OR. REV. STAT. § 69.280(2)(a) (1977);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.08.070(2)(a) (Supp. 1977).




sioned that a limited partner should be able to exercise such a
power. 155
The presence of these powers in a partnership agreement to-
gether with the statutory assurance that their exercise will not sub-
ject limited partners to general liability provide investors with
considerable authority over general partners even if never exer-
cised. The general partners know that their tenure as managers or
the existence of the business in the form contained in the initial
partnership agreement depends on the continued approval of the
limited partners, assuming, as is usually true, that the non-manag-
ers have a greater interest in the partnership than its managers.
The general partners, therefore, must conduct enterprise affairs in
a manner calculated to earn the approval of enterprise investors.
If the limited partners ever dismissed the original general partners
and elected replacements, the new general partners would likely
be even more dependent on limited partner approval than their
predecessors. Nothing could offer greater proof of the limited
partners' intent to oversee carefully the conduct of partnership af-
fairs than their decision to replace those whose conduct they ques-
tioned.
Consequently, provisions in a partnership agreement granting
limited partners these powers, even if never exercised, would seem
to be contrary to the basic principles of the original ULPA. They
provide limited partners with a powerful weapon that can be used
to exercise control with the assurance that limited liability will be
maintained whatever the consequences of their acts. The effects
test, by contrast, would provide no such guarantee. If a creditor
can demonstrate that the limited partners ever threatened to exer-
cise any of their powers, he may be able to convince a fact finder
that the limited partners had forced the general partners to imple-
ment their business judgment in the conduct of partnership af-
fairs. If so, they have managed the enterprise just as effectively as
if they themselves were general partners and would be generally
liable for the adverse consequences of their acts under the inter-
pretation of the test proposed here. In Holzman, for example, the
court never indicated how the limited partners obtained the au-
155. See Lewis, The Uniform Limited Partnership Ac4 65 U. PA. L. REv. 715, 717
(1917):
[G]eneral partners secure the additional funds necessary for the prosecution of the
business, and yet remain in control of the business; while if a corporation is
formed, all the contributors to the capital stock acquire the right to take part in
the management to the extent of a right to vote for the board of directors.
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thority they exercised. 56 If the amended version of section 7 had
been adopted by California at the time of the case, the limited
partners might have escaped liability by simply voting to amend
the partnership agreement to convert it from a farming enterprise
to an enterprise organized to farm watermelons.15 7 The same situ-
ation might arise in a public real estate limited partnership if one
or two limited partners were in a position to persuade a number of
others that a particular piece of property was best suited to meet
their needs. It is questionable whether the amended section 7
would protect unsecured creditors from the damage limited part-
ners could effectuate in this way.
If the limited partners actually dismiss the general partners
and take charge of enterprise operations on their own, their liabil-
ity to subsequent creditors under either version of section 7 would
probably be the same. Their responsibility for the future prosper-
ity of the enterprise should be no different than where they share
decisionmaking authority with the general partners.15 8 Their lia-
bility to prior creditors, however, would be different. Section 7, as
amended, would treat the limited partners as new general partners
whose liability does not exceed their actual contributions to the
enterprise.1 9 Under the original control rule, as interpreted here,
however, the limited partners would remain limited partners but
would be liable to prior creditors if the enterprise subsequently
became insolvent, since the creditors suffered from the interfer-
ence of the limited partners who they reasonably assumed would
not be interjecting their personal business judgments into the
course of partnership affairs.
If the limited partners dismiss the general partners and simply
elect others to replace them, they would not be liable to any credi-
tors under the amended version of section 7. Under the original
version, however, they would face liability to some creditors if an
effects test were adopted by the courts. The decision to change
general partners is an exercise of business judgment by the limited
partners concerning the proper conduct of the enterprise, and con-
sequently, they would be liable to those adversely affected by their
156. 86 Cal. App. 2d at 858, 195 P.2d at 833.
157. In addition, it is arguable that the limited partners could impose their will on a
recalcitrant general partner by simply threatening to exercise their powers of removal or
dissolution and still maintain limited liability. A court, however, might view the threatened
exercise of a legitimate power as different from its actual exercise.
158. See section II(B)(l) supra.





As conceived by the draftsmen in 1916, the limited partnership
statute was designed to provide an individual who possessed man-
agerial skills and little or no capital the opportunity to own a por-
tion of an investor-backed enterprise. 161 More importantly, the
draftsmen allowed him as much control over the business of the
partnership as he could negotiate. To assure responsible manage-
ment, they preserved creditors' rights against partners in partner-
ships without limited partners. 6 2 To protect both general partners
and creditors, they extended creditors' rights of recovery not only
to general partners but also to limited partners whenever the busi-
ness judgment of the latter might be applied to decide the course
of enterprise affairs. 163 The express purpose of the draftsmen was
to enable individuals with small businesses to acquire new capital
without having to sacrifice some of their powers by having to in-
corporate to attract investors."6 The effects test proposed here
seeks to maintain the fundamental relationships between the par-
ties and yet provides a workable, predictable standard for deter-
mining when the limited partner should be held accountable for
being something more than a partnership investor.
The amended versions of section 7, however, substantially al-
ter the equilibrium among manager, investor, and creditor estab-
lished by the original Act. The amendment gives general partners
less authority over the enterprise than they would have had by
incorporating. It provides limited partners with substantially more
control than they would have been able to exercise as stockhold-
160. This would most likely relate to prior creditors. If obligations to them are out-
standing when the replacement occurs, their ability to recover will be largely dependent on
the skills of the new management team the limited partners have chosen. If the partnership
is solvent at the time the change is made and subsequently becomes insolvent, the limited
partners may not be able to demonstrate that their role had an insubstantial effect on the
business activities of the enterprise. If the venture is insdlvehit at the fired the fhew general
partners assume control, and if the assets of the partnership, if dissolved, would be insuffi-
cient to meet creditor obligations, then the most creditors could hope to receive from the
enterprise would be the value of its assets. If the new management is unable to save the
venture, the most harm the creditors can be said to suffer is loss of this amount. Therefore,
the liability of the limited partners should not exceed the value of partnership assets when
they replace thegeneral partners.
161. SeeLewis, supranote 155, at 717-19.
162. ULPA § 9 (1916); see id § 1, Official Comment.
163. Id § 7; see id § 1, Official Comment.
164. Id § 1, Official Comment.
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ers. It may force general partners to assume liability for the conse-
quences of decisions made by others and may deny creditors the
security they once enjoyed of knowing that those actually mana-
ging the enterprise will be accountable for their acts.
The adoption of this amendment by several state legislatures
raises serious questions about the purpose and continued viability
of the limited partnership as a form of business organization. Sup-
port for the amendment is motivated by a very real concern for
the protection of investors, but the enterprise it creates is devoid of
internal logic or coherent structure. As limited partnerships in-
crease in size, they become more and more like corporations.
Problems that may arise among participants or between partici-
pants and third parties can best be solved by applying rules estab-
lishing powers and duties parallel to those imposed on corporation
relationships. This amendment is an inevitable step in that direc-
tion. As long as federal tax incentives encourage partnership or-
ganization, 65 public limited partnerships will continue to exist.
These facts create a serious dilemma for state legislatures.
They are charged with the responsibility of facilitating economic
prosperity in their respective states. In order to encourage the
kinds of business endeavors public limited partnerships currently
pursue, each legislature must retain as many aspects of traditional
limited partnership law as possible. The greater the resemblance
between limited partnership law and corporation law, the more
likely it is that the Internal Revenue Service will fmally persuade
Congress to tax limited partnerships like corporations.'66 At the
same time, legislatures have a duty to enact laws that are rational
and equitable. This consideration dictates just the opposite result.
The solution lies with Congress. Until it is willing to recognize
that tax incentives are more closely related to particular kinds of
business endeavors and not the form in which they are organized,
the inconsistencies and inequities of the modern limited partner-
ship will only become more pronounced.
165. Because partnerships are not taxed as separate entities they are used to pass
through losses to offset individual income. I.R.C. § 704(d).
166. SeeI.R.C. § 7701.
[Vol. 28:785
